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ReservoirHendra viruswasﬁrst described in 1994 in Australia, causally associatedwith a cluster of fatal equine and human
cases at a thoroughbred racing stable in the Brisbane suburb of Hendra. This year marks the twentieth anniver-
sary of the identiﬁcation of pteropid bats (ﬂying-foxes) as the natural host of the virus, and it is timely to reﬂect
on a pivotal meeting of an eclectic group of scientists in that process. They included animal and public health ex-
perts, environmental scientists, veterinary and horse industry representatives, andwildlife experts. The task was
to review and prioritise wildlife surveillance seeking the origin of the previously unknown virus. The group de-
termined that the likely reservoirmust occur in disparate locations, and be capable ofmoving between locations,
or exist in continuous, overlapping populations spanningmultiple locations. Flying-foxeswere considered to be a
more probable source of the novel virus than birds. Within weeks, antibodies were detected in several species of
ﬂying-fox, and the virus was subsequently isolated. While the identiﬁcation of the natural host of Hendra virus
within 18 months of its description was remarkable in itself, a broader legacy followed. In the subsequent
years, a suite of zoonotic viruses including Australian bat lyssavirus, Nipah virus, SARS coronavirus, and Ebola
and Marburg viruses have been detected in bats. Bats are now the “go to” taxa for novel viruses. History has re-
peatedly demonstrated that knowledge begets knowledge. This simple notion of bringing a diverse group of peo-
ple together in an environment of mutual respect reinforced this principle and proves that the sum is often so
much more powerful than the parts.
© 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Hendra virus, a novel zoonotic paramyxovirus, was ﬁrst described in
1994 in Australia causally associated with a cluster of fatal equine and
human cases at a thoroughbred racing stable in the Brisbane suburb of
Hendra [1,6,9]. The subsequent identiﬁcation of pteropid bats
(Chiroptera: Pteropodidae) as the natural host of the virus precipitated
a focus on bats as the source of emerging zoonoses that continues to
this day. However, at that time, the identiﬁcation of the reservoir of
Hendra virus (initially known as equine morbillivirus) was urgent and
confronting. This yearmarks the twentieth anniversary of the identiﬁca-
tion of the natural host for Hendra virus, and it is timely to reﬂect on a
pivotal event in that process—the singular coming together of a group
of scientists from diverse backgrounds at the Queensland Government
Animal Research Institute in Brisbane in early 1996. The objective of the
cross-disciplinary think tank was to review and revise research seeking
the origins of Hendra virus, and its deliberations were key to the timely
identiﬁcation of the natural host.Field).
pen access article under the CC BY-NThe impetus for the meeting was ﬁrstly a failure of initial investiga-
tions to ﬁnd evidence of the virus in a wide range of potential natural
hosts—both native and introduced animals—caught in the paddock
where the equine index case was at pasture. Even mosquitoes had
been examined on the basis that they might serendipitously “blood
sample” an elusive host that had avoided capture and testing [4]. The
second motivating factor was the retrospective identiﬁcation (in late
1995) of a second Hendra virus incident involving two equine cases
and a human case on a property at Mackay, 800 km north of the
Brisbane outbreak [8]. The human case had relapsed after an initial
brief illness 14 months earlier [7]. Thus, there were now two known
foci of infection with this novel virus that were spatially disparate, but
temporally clustered within a fewweeks of each other. Intensive epide-
miological tracing failed to ﬁnd linkages with horse movements or any
other contact between the two case properties. Wildlife surveillance at
and around the second property also failed to provide any clues.
At this point, extensive efforts weremade by both public and animal
health agencies to seek any evidence that this virus had previously
affectedhorses or humans. Case reviewswere conducted and retrospec-
tive histopathology undertakenwherewarranted. No evidence of previ-
ous infection was found.C-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Table 1
Plan for EMV activities.
Animal Priority Approach *Nominated
people
Comments
1. Fruit bats H Challenge experiments AAHL Existing collections
from Mackay and Brisbane
KD, AAHL, PY HMcC 4 species in Qld, Black and Little Red are most widespread in Qld,
eligibility criteria for inclusion needs to be thought through
2. Insects H Cannon Hill, Mackay, Longpocket, AQIS, QIMR, BCC WD, PY, SMac Locate sources of insects
3. Feral cats H Cannon Hill, other sites in Brisbane HF, SMac Contact Jonathan Lee (Lands Dept_—Check BCC
Program—HF
4. Hares M Cannon Hill, other sites in Brisbane HF, SMac
5. Birds M Challenge experiments AAHL
Brisbane/Mackay—vets and carers





Cattle egrets and ibis especially
6. Reptiles
(snakes)
M Challenge experiments AAHL
Brisbane/Mackay—bleed found snakes, tissue
samples from dead snakes




Clarify validity of antibody response (includes literature review)
NC & HF to visit Cannon Hill for list of species
7. Rodents L Cannon Hill, Mackay—Trap, bleed and release HF, KS, SMac Check Mossman and J viruses Conﬁrm species common to
Cannon Hill and Mackay
8. Marsupials L Challenge experiments AAHL
Local vets and carers
KD, AAHL, PY, SMac, KS,
HF
9. Amphibians L Challenge experiments AAHL KD, AAHL, PY
PY, KD, HF, GG
Refer to DEH distribution maps, record calls at Cannon Hill and
Mackay
10. Other bats L Not at this stage
11. Invertebrates L Not at this stage
The action plan outcome of the “think tank”meeting of January 1996. Fruit bats, insects, and feral catswere identiﬁedas highpriority (H) for investigation. EMV=equinemorbillivirus, the
initial name of Hendra virus; AAHL = the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory; AQIS = Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service; QIMR = Queensland Institute of Medical
Research; BCC = Brisbane City Council; DEH = Queensland Department of Environment and Heritage; RADU (typographical error in the original table) = RAOU = Royal Australian
Ornithological Union; KD = Kevin Dunn; HF = Hume Field; GG = Gordon Grigg; HMcC = Hamish McCallum; SMac = Sandy Mackenzie; KS = Kevin Seppanen; PY = Peter Young.
WD and NC are not recalled by the authors.
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Government (the Department of Primary Industries—DPI) brought to-
gether a range of expertise to answer the question “Where to go now
in the search for a natural host of this virus?” That expertise included an-
imal health experts and public health physicians, environmental science
professionals, horse industry representatives, and equine practitioners
and, as a novel paramyxovirus had been previously isolated from vipers
[3], even an expert on snakes and reptiles. This seminal “One Health”
meeting was convened in a neutral environment that promoted trust
and respect between a diverse group of people who did not necessarily
know each other but shared a common interest and purpose.
After a review of the initial research in the context of the new case
information, the group concluded that the prime suspect would have
been present in both Brisbane and Mackay, and either be capable of
moving between both locations, or exist in continuous, overlapping
populations encompassing both locations. The notion of a more seden-
tary host “hitch-hiking” on a vehicle was considered and rejected, and
it was concluded that the natural host would likely be volant. Indeed,
the same bird species were observed to forage around horses at both
the Brisbane and Mackay properties. Dr Hamish McCallum, at that
time a zoologist at the University of Queensland, suggested that ﬂying
foxes (nomadic fruit bats of the genus Pteropus) also be considered.
After some discussion, it was (somewhat naively) thought that ﬂying
foxes, being mammals, were more likely than birds to host viruses
that might infect horses and humans. The meeting closed with bats, in-
sects, and cats as the top targets for future studies (Table 1).
Ironically, the DPI research group had screened a small number of
ﬂying foxes in itsMackay surveillance efforts, but all had tested negative
[4].Withinweeks of prioritizingﬂying foxes and testing animals in tem-
porary captivitywithwildlife rehabilitators, antibodieswere detected in
three ﬂying fox species, and the hunt to detect the virus itself began
[11]. This took more than a year, but eventually, the identical virus
was isolated from a ﬂying fox [5].
The meeting and the subsequent events illustrate the fundamental
scientiﬁc approach to a novel situation: deﬁne the research question,
generate a hypothesis, test the hypothesis, and in the case of infectious
agents, seek to fulﬁll Koch's postulates. While others may also havethought ﬂying foxes a plausible natural host, it was this meeting
and the subsequent efforts that led to the hypothesis being tested
and proved. The knowledge advance was garnered by embracing
those with disparate knowledge sets—an important lesson for this day
and age. It was truly an early example of the One Health approach at
work.
The identiﬁcation of the natural host of Hendra virus within 18
months of its description was a remarkable feat in itself. However, it is
worthwhile considering the cascading effects that were directly, if not
exclusively, the result of this meeting. In the subsequent years, a suite
of zoonotic viruses including Australian bat lyssavirus, Nipah virus,
SARS coronavirus, and Ebola and Marburg viruses have been detected
in bats [2]. Bats are now regarded as the evolutionary origin of
lyssaviruses, coronaviruses, and paramyxoviruses, and their immune
systems are being trawled for the secrets of surviving pathogenic infec-
tions [10]—bats are now the “go to” taxa for novel viruses.
History has repeatedly demonstrated that knowledge begets knowl-
edge. This simple notion of bringing a diverse group of people together
in an environment of mutual respect reinforced this principle and
proves that the sum is often so much more powerful than the parts.Acknowledgements
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